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Abstract
This paper presents an application of evolutionary portfolio theory
to stocks listed in the Swiss Market Index (SMI). We study numer-
ically the long-run outcome of the competition of rebalancing rules
for market shares in a stock market with actual dividends taken from
firms listed in the SMI. Returns are endogenous because prices are
determined by supply and demand stemming from the rebalancing
rules. Our simulations show that in competition with rebalancing
rules derived from Mean-Variance Optimization, Maximum Growth
Theory and Behavioral Finance, the evolutionary portfolio rule dis-
covered in Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001) will eventually hold total
market wealth. According to this simple rule the portfolio weights
should be proportional to the expected relative dividends of the as-
sets.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical and experimental work has done a lot to undermine the
long sustained belief in market rationality (see for example Campbell (2000),
Hirshleifer (2001) and De Bondt (1999) for surveys). These important facts
have initiated a new behavioral paradigm for finance that according to many
researchers in the field might replace or at least complement traditional fi-
nance. It is currently believed that thinking in terms like excess volatility,
irrational exuberance, market risk and loss aversion will soon substitute the
cornerstones of traditional finance, mean-variance-analysis, arbitrage pricing
and the efficient market hypothesis. While the fight of the rational and the
behavioral finance paradigm is in its decisive stage, we argue that a third
paradigm, evolutionary finance, should not be omitted. Thinking in terms
of strategies, market selection and mutation seems to be very appropriate in
finance. On the stock market, for example, a heterogeneous population of
portfolio strategies interact frequently with each other—competing for mar-
ket capital. Market selection is perhaps most severe on these markets and
mutations respectively innovations occur frequently. A long time ago Fried-
man (1953) and Fama (1965) have recognized the power of evolutionary ideas
in finance. Using these ideas they argued that the market naturally selects
for the rational strategies. As an effect market selection would lead to mar-
ket efficiency. This specific outcome of the market selection process could
not be sustained in general. For example Shleifer (2000, Chap. 2.2) shows
that under specific circumstances noise traders can earn a higher average
rate of return than rational arbitrageurs. However, it may be asked whether
Shleifer‘s example depends on a too narrowly defined set of strategies. The
answer to this important question is the core of evolutionary finance. It
can only be given in a precise but general model of the market selection
process. Some considerable progress in the field of evolutionary finance has
been made since Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965). This progress was made
possible due to a formalization of evolutionary reasoning based on game
theoretic concepts using computer simulations and advanced mathematical
techniques. Many time series properties of asset prices, for example, have
found an explanation by evolutionary reasoning (Arthur, Holland, LeBaron,
Palmer, and Taylor (1997), LeBaron, Arthur, and Palmer (1999), Brock and
Hommes (1997), and Lux (1994) among others). These results have also
received very good recognition in practitioner’s news letters (Mauboussin
(1999)). In the area of portfolio theory, the seminal work of Blume and
Easley (1992) has laid the foundations for a series of papers (Sandroni (2000),
Blume and Easley (2001), Sciubba (1999), Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001),
Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002b), Amir, Evstigneev, Hens, and
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Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001)) developing an evolutionary portfolio theory. This the-
ory gives a general model of the market selection process in which the hy-
potheses put forward by Friedman and Fama can be studied for any set of
assets and any set of strategies. It turns out that as long as there are excess
returns there still exist strategies that can gain market wealth at the expense
of the existing strategies. Moreover there is one strategy, the evolutionary
portfolio rule discovered in Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001), that eliminates
all excess returns and that will eventually hold total market wealth in the
market selection process.
While the theoretical papers on evolutionary portfolio selection derive
asymptotic results in idealized markets, the point of this paper is to apply the
evolutionary ideas to stocks from the SMI. The portfolio choice considered in
our paper is the decision how to allocate wealth among shares yielding a div-
idend as observed in the Swiss Market data. We focus attention on dynamic
portfolio strategies. That is to say we view a modern capital market, like the
SWX, as a heterogenous population of dynamic portfolio strategies. These
strategies interact repeatedly via the market mechanism and are thereby
competing for market capital. However instead of considering all theoreti-
cally possible dynamic portfolio rules we take a more pragmatic point of view
here and restrict attention to simple rebalancing rules. A simple rebalancing
rule holds certain portfolio weights constant for a long period. Hence if mar-
ket prices fluctuate a rebalancing rule has to adjust the number of shares it
holds so as to keep the proportions of wealth in its portfolio constant. Many
institutional investors follow simple rebalancing rules. Some of them because
they have committed to manage third parties money according to a certain
asset allocation1, some because they believe that rebalancing is an optimal
behavior in volatile markets2 and some because they use trading strategies
derived from some clever reasoning like contrarian behavior that in essence
are rebalancing rules3. As Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002b)
have demonstrated in the case of short-lived assets, the simple evolutionary
rebalancing rule considered in this paper is not only able to outperform any
other simple portfolio strategy but it will also dominate any general portfolio
strategy given it is adapted to the price process. Hence it may be argued
1In many prospects of mutual funds some asset allocation, e.g. 60% technology stock
and 40% brick and water stocks, is proposed as an optimal investment rule so that the
investors would feel cheated if these proportions fall out of balance.
2Suppose for example that prices follow a random walk, an often hold assertion, then
rebalancing means that on average one buys cheap and sells high!
3Following a contrarian behavioral strategy, like that of De Bondt and Thaler (1985)
for example, one sells those stocks that have gone up and buys those that went down,
which is also the main feature of rebalancing rules.
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that the restriction to simple rebalancing rules does not restrict the outcome
of the market selection process.
Since from the market selection point of view the market interaction of
the various portfolio rules is decisive, we cannot simply do an empirical study
of the relative performance of rebalancing rules on a given return path. This
would ignore the impact one strategy has on its competitors4. Hence we
have to rely on simulations in order to show the would-be performance of
various portfolio rules that are interacting in a market with the Swiss Mar-
ket dividends. It turns out that the best rebalancing strategy for exogenous
returns, the growth optimal portfolio, also called the maximum growth strat-
egy (Hakansson 1970), is not necessarily the best performing strategy once
market interaction is taken into account. Our simulations show that in com-
petition with rebalancing rules derived from Mean-Variance Optimization,
Maximum Growth Theory as well as Behavioral Finance, the Evolutionary
Finance rule discovered in Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001) will eventually
hold total market wealth. According to this simple rule the portfolio weights
should be proportional to the expected relative dividends of the assets. Note
that the portfolio weights used by the evolutionary strategy are based solely
on fundamentals, ignoring any price fluctuations! As it turns out, in the long
run as its wealth share grows, prices will stop fluctuating and settle down
on the relative expected dividends of the assets because eventually only the
single surviving evolutionary rule will determine market prices. This is of
course a very strong prediction. Our simulations show that even though the
final proceeds of the evolutionary process are huge (one gets total market
wealth), one might have to wait really long before this happens. However
even a very modest investor will be pleased with the growth of the market
share of the evolutionary rule. Starting from equal grounds, after 4 periods
the evolutionary rule has doubled its market share for the first time and it
takes another 46 periods to double it once more. And starting from a market
share of only 0.1% which is 1% of the others market shares, the first dou-
bling of the evolutionary rule‘s market shares happens after only 2 periods,
the second doubling after 9 periods and the third doubling after 40 periods
and after 79 periods it has reached 10 times the market share it started from.
Hence in contrast to the well know critique on the maximum growth litera-
ture, put forward for example by Rubinstein (1991), the convergence of the
process is much faster when prices are exogenous. It should also be noted
4Note that we are not claiming that individual traders have a huge impact on market
prices. From an evolutionary point of view the strategy according to which market capital
is managed is crucial, it is not important whether fund X or fund Y or both are using this
strategy. Hence it may be that a certain commonly used strategy like the mean-variance-
rule has a huge impact while no individual fund has any impact on market prices.
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that every run of the simulation looks pretty much the same. Indeed, the
variance over the different runs of the simulations is negligible. Based on
30 runs we found that the standard deviation of the market shares averaged
over all periods is only 0.21%.
In passing we would like to mention that for the case of long-lived assets
considered here, so far the theoretical literature has not been able to prove
what our simulations show: the global convergence of the evolutionary pro-
cess towards a situation in which all wealth is managed by the evolutionary
rule found in Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001)5. Hence our “application” of
the evolutionary portfolio theory also hints at new theoretical results.
In the next section 2 we briefly recall the evolutionary portfolio model
of this paper. Section 3 gives some intuition on evolutionary investment.
Section 4 presents the application of this model to a market with dividends
taken from the SMI. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 provides the
intuition thereof. Section 7 concludes. Data and portfolio rules are collected
in an appendix. The Excel scripts used in the simulations are available on
the web at www.iew.unizh.ch/grp/hens.
2 An Evolutionary Stock Market Model
We consider a financial market with K long-lived assets and cash. Time is
discrete and denoted by t = ...,−1, 0, 1, ... . Each asset k = 1, ...,K pays
off a dividend per share at the beginning of every period and before trade
takes place in this period. Dkt ≥ 0 denotes the total dividend paid to all
shareholders of asset k at the beginning of period t. Dkt depends on the
history of states of the world ωt = (...,ωt−1,ωt) where ωt ∈ Ω is the state
revealed at the beginning of period t. Ω is assumed to be finite, and every
state is drawn with some strictly positive probability.
Dividend payoffs are in terms of cash. Cash is used to buy consumption
goods. It is not used to store value. The supply of every asset k, skt , is
exogenous and normalized to 1. The supply of cash s0t is given by the total
dividends of all assets.
There are finitely many portfolio rules (also referred to as investment
strategy) indexed by i = 1, ..., I, I ≥ 2, each is pursued by an investor.
The portfolio rule of investor i is a fixed constant proportions strategy λi =
(λik)k=0,...,K with λ
i
k ∈ [0, 1] for all k = 0, ...,K and
∑K
k=0 λ
i
k = 1. For each
5For the case of short-lived assets, global convergence to the evolutionary rule has been
demonstrated under very general conditions by Amir, Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-
Hoppe´ (2001). For long-lived assets, Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002a) are
able to demonstrate that this rule is the unique evolutionary stable strategy.
5
k ≥ 1, λik is the fraction of the wealth investor i assigns to the purchase
of the risky asset k. λi0 is the fraction of wealth hold in cash. Investment
strategies are distinct across investors6. To ensure that all asset prices are
strictly positive, we assume that at least one strategy is completely mixed,
i.e. λik ∈ (0, 1) for all k.
For a given portfolio rule λi and wealth wit, the portfolio purchased by
investor i at the beginning of period t is given by
θit,k =
λik w
i
t
pkt
k = 0, 1, ...,K. (1)
θit,0 is the units of cash and θ
i
t,k is the units of assets hold by investor i.
Since we have normalized the supply of the long-lived assets to 1, θit,k is the
percentage of all shares issued of asset k that investor i purchases. pkt denotes
the market clearing price of asset k in period t. We normalize the price for
cash p0t = 1 in every period t. The price of the consumption good is also the
numeraire.
For any portfolio holdings of agents (θit)i=1,...,I the market equilibrium
conditions for cash and long-lived assets are given by
I∑
i=1
θit,k = s
k
t , k = 0, ...,K, (2)
where the supply of the risky assets is skt = 1, while the supply of cash is
given by
s0t =
K∑
k=1
Dkt (ω
t) (3)
The budget constraint of investor i in every period t = 0, 1, ...
K∑
k=0
pkt θ
i
t,k = w
i
t (4)
is fulfilled since the fractions λik, k = 0, ...,K, add up to one, see (1).
Since every investor consumes the fraction λi0 of his wealth in any period,
the wealth of investor i (in terms of the price of the consumption good) at
the beginning of period t + 1 and after dividends are payed turns out to be
given by
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
(Dkt+1(ω
t+1) + pkt+1) θ
i
t,k (5)
6The case of investors pursuing the same portfolio rule can be handled as follows.
Investors with the same strategy set up a fund with claims equal to their initial share.
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The wealth changes because of dividend payments and capital gains. The
cash θi0(t) hold by every investor is consumed. The amount of cash available
in any one period stems only from dividend payments.
The market-clearing price pkt for the risky assets (k ≥ 1) can be derived
from (2) by inserting (1). One finds
pkt =
I∑
i=1
λik w
i
t = λk wt (6)
where λk = (λ1k, ...,λ
I
k) and w
T
t = (w
1
t , ..., w
I
t ).
Inserting (1) and (6) in (5) one obtains
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
(
Dkt+1(ω
t+1) + λk wt+1
) λik wit
λk wt
(7)
This is an implicit equation for the wealth of each investor i, wit+1, for a
given distribution of wealth wt across investors. It is convenient for the
further analysis to define
Ait =
K∑
k=1
Dkt+1(ω
t+1)
λik w
i
t
λk wt
, and Bi,kt =
λik w
i
t
λk wt
(8)
The time index refers to the dependence on wealth: Ait and B
i,k
t both depend
on the wealth in period t. (7) can now be written as
wit+1 = A
i
t +
K∑
k=1
Bi,kt λk wt+1 (9)
and thus
wt+1 = At + Bt Λwt+1 (10)
where ΛT = (λT1 , ...,λ
T
K) ∈ RI×K is the matrix of portfolio rules, and Bt ∈
RI×K is the matrix of portfolios in period t. ATt = (A
1
t , ..., A
I
t ) ∈ RI are the
dividends payments, and Bt Λwt+1 are the capital gains.
We need to solve (9) to derive an explicit law of motion—a random dy-
namical system—governing the distribution of wealth across strategies. One
has
wt+1 = [Id−Bt Λ]−1 At (11)
with Id being the identity matrix in RI×I . The matrix [Id−Bt Λ] is invertible
and its inverse is positive because the positive matrix [Bt Λ] can be considered
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as an input-output matrix for which the vector wt =
(
w1t , ..., w
I
t
)
shows
that it is productive: Post multiplying [Id−Bt Λ] by wTt yields the vector
λ0
(
w1t , ..., w
I
t
)T
>> 0. Hence by the proof of proposition 5.A.A.1 in Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) the matrix [Id−Bt Λ] is invertible and
its inverse is positive.
For every distribution of wealth wt and every state of nature ωt, (11)
yields the distribution of wealth wt+1 in the subsequent period in time. We
can state the law of motion in the convenient form
wt+1 = ft(ω
t+1, wt) (12)
where
ft(ω
t+1, wt) =
[
Id−
[
λik w
i
t
λk wt
]k
i
Λ
]−1 [ K∑
k=1
Dkt+1(ω
t+1)
λik w
i
t
λk wt
]
i
The final step is to derive the law of motion for the investors’ market
shares. This will complete the derivation of the evolutionary stock market
model.
It is clear that other things being equal, a smaller rate of consumption
leads to a higher growth rate of wealth. To avoid this tradeoff between
superiority of a portfolio rule and higher rate of consumption, the following
assumption is made.
(A) All investors have the same rate of consumption, i.e. λi0 = λ0 for all
i = 1, ..., I.
Without assumption (A) the evolution of wealth would be biased in favor
of investors with a high saving rate.
Aggregating (7) over investors, one finds
Wt+1 =
K∑
k=1
Dkt+1(ω
t+1) +
K∑
k=1
λk wt+1 = Dt+1(ω
t+1) + (1− λ0)Wt+1 (13)
where Dt+1(ωt+1) =
∑K
k=1 D
k
t+1(ω
t+1) is the aggregate dividend payment.
The last equality holds because
∑K
k=1 λk wt+1 =
∑I
i=1
∑K
k=1 λ
i
k w
i
t+1 = (1 −
λ0)
∑I
i=1 w
i
t+1.
Equation (13) implies
Wt+1 =
Dt+1(ωt+1)
λ0
(14)
The economy grows (or declines) with rate Dt+1(ωt+1)/(λ0 Wt). The
growth rate is thus the ratio of the rate at which additional wealth is injected
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by dividends, Dt+1(ωt+1)/Wt, to the rate at which wealth is withdrawn from
the process for consumption, λ0.
The market share of investor i is rit = w
i
t/Wt. Using (14) and exploiting
the particular structure of the variables (8) that define the law of motion
(12), we obtain
rt+1 =
λ0
Dt+1(ωt+1)
ft(ω
t+1, rt) (15)
or, equivalently,
rt+1 = λ0
(
Id−
[
λik r
i
t
λk rt
]k
i
Λ
)−1 [ K∑
k=1
dkt+1(ω
t+1)
λik r
i
t
λk rt
]
i
(16)
where dkt+1(ω
t+1) = Dkt+1(ω
t+1)/Dt+1(ωt+1) is the relative dividend payment
of asset k. (16) is called the market selection process.
Eq. (16) generates a (non-autonomous) random dynamical system on the
simplex ∆I = {r ∈ RI | ri ≥ 0,∑i ri = 1}. For any initial distribution
of wealth w0 ∈ RI+, (16) defines the path of market shares on the event
tree with branches ωt. The initial distribution of market shares is given by
(ri0)i = (w
i
0/W0)i.
The wealth of an investor i in any period in time can be derived from her
market share and the aggregate wealth, defined by (14), as
wit+1 =
Dt+1(ωt+1)
λ0
rit+1 (17)
The further analysis is restricted to the stationary case. We make the
following assumption.
(B) Stationary (i.i.d.) relative dividend payments dkt (ω
t) = dk(ωt), for all
k = 1, ...,K.
3 Evolutionary Investment
In this section we derive and motivate an evolutionary investment rule λ∗
which was first discovered in Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001) in a simpler
model. This portfolio rule is the only candidate for a rule that can attract
all market wealth. That is to say, supposing the market selection process
(16) converges, then the portfolio rule that conquers the whole market has
to be the evolutionary investment rule λ∗. It is important to point out that
in all our simulations convergence of the process was obtained. We also give
an interpretation of the evolutionary investment rule λ∗ in terms of the well-
known growth optimal portfolio rule (Hakansson 1970). It turns out that λ∗
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is the growth optimal portfolio rule in a population of rules which generates
prices equal to λ∗.
To this end we analyze the market selection process close to the one-owns-
all states, i.e. we investigate the local dynamics close to the vertices of the
simplex of market shares. We make the non-redundancy assumption
(C) Absence of redundant assets, i.e. the matrix of relative dividend pay-
ments (dk(ω))k=1,...,Kω∈Ω has full rank.
Under this assumption these states are the only deterministic steady
states in pools of simple strategies (Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´
2002a).
Suppose one investor, say investor j, owns the market wealth. The in-
vestment strategy, λj, of this investor determines prices in this case. One has
pkt = λ
j
kWt, and p
k
t+1 = λ
j
kWt+1. Under this assumption, (5) yields
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Dkt+1(ω
t+1) + pkt+1
Wt+1
λik w
i
t
pkt
=
K∑
k=1
(
Dkt+1(ω
t+1)
Wt+1
+ λjk
)
λik w
i
t
λjk Wt
=
K∑
k=1
(
λ0 d
k(ωt+1)
λik
λjk
+ λik
)
rit =
(
1− λ0 + λ0
K∑
k=1
dk(ωt+1)
λik
λjk
)
rit
where rit =
wit
Wt
, Wt+1 = Dt+1(ωt+1)/(1− λ0), and
∑K
k=1 λ
i
k = 1− λ0.
The exponential growth rate of investor i’s market share at λj-prices can
be inferred from this equation. It is given by,
gλj(λ
i) = E ln
[
1− λ0 + λ0
K∑
k=1
dk(ω)
λik
λjk
]
(18)
One can show Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002a)
Theorem 1 The portfolio rule λ∗, defined by
λ∗k = (1− λ0) Edk(ω) (19)
is the only investment strategy that is locally stable in any pool of portfolio
rules. That is, gλ∗(λ) < 0 and gλ(λ∗) > 0 for all λ %= λ∗.
Hence supposing the evolutionary process of wealth converges, it can only
converge to λ∗. Moreover, as the following corollary shows the strategy λ∗ is
related to the growth optimal portfolio.
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Corollary 1 The portfolio rule λ∗k = (1− λ0) Edk(ω) is the growth optimal
investment strategy in a population where itself determines the asset prices,
i.e.
λ∗ = arg max
λ:
∑
k λk=1−λ0
E ln
(∑
k
dk(ω) + λ∗k
λ∗k
λk
)
.
Corollary 1 follows from gλ∗(λ) < 0 together with the observation that
gλ∗(λ∗) = 0.
Before we pass on to the application we like to mention that one impli-
cation of equation (18) is that underdiversification is fatal for investment.
Supposing some strategy does not use all assets it can easily be driven out
by any completely diversified strategy. In particular the illusionary diversifi-
cation rule according to which one puts equal weights on all assets can drive
out sophisticated rules based on some optimization criterion like for example
the mean-variance rule.
Corollary 2 Suppose some incumbent rule λj with λjk = 0 for some asset
k has conquered the market then any portfolio rule λi with λik > 0 for all k
grows against λj, i.e. gλj(λ
i) > 0.
4 Application to the SMI
In this section we apply the general evolutionary portfolio theory model out-
lined before to data from the Swiss Market Index. To this purpose we consider
the total dividends paid by 13 stocks from the years 1989 to 2001, see ap-
pendix A for the data. Those 13 years and those 13 stocks have been selected
because for other years and other stocks we could not get the necessary data.
We interpret this data in terms of our model in the following way. First we
assume that the 13 years are 13 realizations of a stationary dividend process.
Hence each date t = 1, ..., 13 is identified with a state s = 1, ..., 13. Each row
of the matrix in appendix A is assumed to model the total dividends Dk(ωz),
k=1,...,13 where z = 1, ...13 denotes the 13 states of this stationary process.
As recently the minimum par value for shares was lowered, some firms did
not pay dividends but partially repaid par value for tax reasons. We consid-
ered these payments as dividends as long as they were in reasonable range
of historically paid amounts.
All portfolio strategies that we consider have one property in common.
They devote the same proportion of wealth to cash holdings which without
loss of generality is assumed to be 10%, i.e. we assume λ0 = 0.1.
We consider two types of portfolio rules. Those based solely on the ex-
ogenous dividends and those based on the endogenous returns. Of the first
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type is the behavioral finance rule which Benartzi and Thaler (1998) have
called illusionary diversification,
λilluk =
1− λ0
K
for all k = 1, ..,K. According to this rule budget shares are set equal for
all risky assets. Benartzi and Thaler (1998) found that surprisingly many
investors use this naive rule. Of the first type is also the evolutionary portfolio
rule from Theorem 1 which was discovered in Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001):
λ∗k = (1− λ0)Edk
for all k = 1, ..,K. The evolutionary rule presumes that agents can form
expectations correctly. It is however well known from behavioral finance that
actual decisions of investors are based on perceived probabilities that may not
coincide with the probabilities that govern the relevant stochastic process.
To allow for this behavioral distortion Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) have
suggested a certain transformation function α : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that overstates
small probabilities and that understates high probabilities. This function
is known as the cumulative prospect theory. We have used the cumulative
prospect theory function as suggested by Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) to
create a second behavioral finance rule based on the portfolio rule λ∗. That
is to say the portfolio rule based on cumulative prospect theory is given by:
λcptk = α(λ
∗
k)
for all k = 1, ..,K. The second type of portfolio rules that we consider
are those based on returns. Since we only want to consider simple portfolio
rules, i.e. those with time independent budget shares, we have to choose some
prices that remain constant in the computation of the returns. In order not
to base the second type of portfolio rules on some unreasonable prices we
give them the advantage of allowing them to use the prices that eventually
will emerge in the evolutionary process. Since we are mainly interested in
the long run behavior of the process these are the prices that determine the
long run returns. And as it turned out those prices are given by λ∗. As an
alternative set of prices that will also give rise to portfolio rules based on
dividends we have taken the case of identical prices for all assets.
One of the most prominent examples of return based portfolio rules is the
mean-variance rule suggested by Markowitz (1952). This rule is certainly one
of the cornerstones of traditional finance and does not require any further
elaboration. Using both sets of prices this results in:
λµ−σ(λ∗) and λµ−σ(1).
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The second type of portfolio rule based on returns is the growth opti-
mal portfolio as suggested for example by Hakansson (1970). This portfolio
strategy maximizes the expected growth rate of wealth on a given return
process. In its most general form this portfolio strategy is allowed to adapt
to the endogenous fluctuations of the returns. It then maximizes the ex-
pected logarithm of the returns, which is also known as the Kelly rule, Kelly
(1956). In this most general from it is clearly unbeatable in the long run
perspective taken in this paper. However in this general form it is quite
difficult to actually compute this rule. One way of interpreting the results
of this paper is to say that with endogenous returns there is a pretty easy
short cut to determine a simple portfolio rule that eventually coincides with
the Kelly rule: Use λ∗ and thus simply divide your income proportional to
the expected relative dividends. This is because as we have argued above,
λgop(λ∗) = λ∗. It is however well known that the growth optimal rule is very
sensitive to mis-specifications of the returns expectations it is based on. In
this paper, as an example for such mis-specifications we consider the growth
optimal portfolio based on the wrong belief that returns are determined only
by the dividends, i.e. by fixing all prices to be equal to one.
λgop(1)
Appendix B shows the portfolio rules that have been computed according
to the various strategies outlined so far. One apparent observation is that the
portfolio strategies based on endogenous returns are underdiversified. The
mean-variance-strategy only uses 4 and the growth optimal portfolio only
uses 1 out of the 13 assets! As we have argued above underdiversification
is fatal for survival in the market selection process. Therefore we do the
mean-variance rule yet another favor and make it completely diversified by
devoting to any asset at least the smallest positive budget share occurring in
the underdiversified portfolio. This ad hoc diversification rule is often used
in praxis:
λµ−σ$ (λ
∗)
Thus all together we consider the market selection process given by equa-
tion (16) when it is run by these 8 portfolio rules.
5 Results of the Market Selection Process
Given the dividend matrix and the strategies described above we have done
simulations of the market selection process with different initial wealth shares
for λ∗, different number of periods. In our final simulation we have also
included noise trading as an additional strategy.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the average market shares of the various strategies
over time. (Average taken over 30 runs.) Confidence intervals.
Figure 1 is based on 30 runs of the market selection process with equal
initial wealth of the 8 strategies described above. Each run was conducted
for 100 periods. The charts in figure 1 are the average market shares of the
various strategies, averaged over the 30 runs. Moreover we have indicated
the confidence interval at a one standard deviation step by some upper and
lower intervals displayed every 10 periods. The standard deviation turns out
to be pretty small with a maximum value of 1% and an average value of
only 0.21%. We can see from figure 1 that the market share of λ∗ increases
steadily from 10% to 60% while the other strategies’ market shares have a
clear downward trend although some of them initially increase.
Figure 2 shows the prices that are implied by the evolution of market
shares. It is astonishing to see that prices converge quite rapidly to their
rational values which are determined by λ∗.
Figure 3 is based on 30 runs of the market selection process with a market
share of only 0.1% for λ∗ and equal initial wealth of 14.3% each for the 7
other strategies described above. Each run was conducted for 1000 periods.
The charts in figure 3 give the average market shares of the various strategies,
averaged over the 30 runs. Moreover we have indicated the confidence inter-
val at a one standard deviation step by some upper and lower intervals. The
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Figure 2: Evolution of share prices over time for one sample path of the
dividend process.
confidence intervals are so narrow that they can hardly be visualized. Note
that the standard deviation is again pretty small. Figure 3 displays an in-
teresting population dynamics. As long as λ∗ is small, its behavioral finance
variation λcpt drives out any other strategy. However λ∗ grows steadily and
eventually drives out and replaces λcpt. Note that the chart of λ∗ is s-shaped.
While λ∗ is small it grows slowly, then it has a rapid take off and eventu-
ally when more and more competitors got close to extinction it slows down
again. Even though λ∗ needs some time to conquer a considerable share of
the market, starting from the 0.1% level it is able to double its share more
rapidly than starting from the 10% level.
In figure 4 we have added noise traders to the picture. That is to say we
included an eighth strategy that in every period chooses the budget shares
randomly from some uniform distribution over the simplex. We endow the
noise strategy with 55% of the total market wealth. This strategy is loosing
rapidly. The performance of the other strategies is not much changed by
noise trading. However, with noise, as figure 5 shows, the prices display
excess volatility which mimics the observation of Shiller (1981) for the Dow
Jones in the years 1928–1978.
All simulations can be verified from the excel sheets that we have made
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Figure 3: Evolution of the average market shares of the various strategies
over time. (Average taken over 30 runs.) Initial market share of λ∗ is 0.1%.
available on www.iew.unizh.ch/grp/hens.
6 Some Intuition for the Results
To get some intuition for the striking results obtained in the previous section
it is instructive to recall the results of the theoretical literature. This litera-
ture considers an investment problem with stationary dividends in which the
returns at any point in time are completely re-invested for the next period.
The starting point was Breiman (1961)’s observation that the best strategy
for repeatedly betting on the occurrence of a finite number of states is to
divide the wealth placed on these bets proportional to the probabilities of
occurrence of the states. This rule has thus been called betting your beliefs.
That is to say, if one holds fixed these proportions then by the Law of Large
Numbers one will maximize the expected growth rate of your wealth. Note
that taking the long run perspective of the Law of Large Numbers risk does
not matter because any short run under performance that still leaves some
positive wealth can eventually be recovered in the long run. This idealistic
point of view on the risk involved in portfolio formation is common to all
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Figure 4: Evolution of the market shares in the model with noise traders
initially owning 55% of the total market wealth. (One sample path of the
dividend process.)
papers on evolutionary portfolio theory. The next step in this literature was
to consider a market for the bets on the various states. Thus if demand for
any one bet were high then the price for this bet will be high and one might
argue that one should rather go for the other bets that offer a more attrac-
tive return. However, as Blume and Easley (1992) have shown this is not
true. The best portfolio rule is still to bet your beliefs. In Breiman (1961)
as well as in Blume and Easley (1992) bets can be identified with states be-
cause, they were considering a complete set of Arrow-securities. Evstigneev,
Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002b) have generalized the set up of Blume and
Easley (1992) to allow for any complete or incomplete asset structure. As
these authors show, the correct generalization of betting your beliefs is then
to divide income proportionally to the expected payoffs of the securities. A
major short coming of the literature so far was the assumption of short lived
assets. According to this assumption in every period, after having paid off,
the asset is liquidated and an identical asset is reborn. Wealth is assumed to
be perishable so that it can only be transferred to later periods by investing
once more in the exogenously supplied assets. Sandroni (2000) and Blume
and Easley (2001) are the first models of this literature with long lived as-
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Figure 5: Evolution of share prices over time for one sample path of the
dividend process in the model with noise traders.)
sets allowing the important feature of capital gains. However these authors
assume a complete security market and moreover their model is based on the
notion of a competitive equilibrium with portfolio rules being generated by
infinite horizon expected utility maximizers. In particular then the model
cannot be written as a dynamical system in which wealth evolves from one
period to the next. Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002a) is the first
dynamical systems model with long lived assets and a completely general
security market. Moreover portfolio rules need not be generated by expected
utility maximization. As mentioned above in that paper the local stability,
the evolutionary stability of monomorphic populations is considered. Sup-
pose that the wealth process converges to the evolutionary stable portfolio
rule λ∗ then capital gains also converge to the dividend payoffs. Hence the
strategy being best suited to the dividends will eventually also profit most
from the capital gains. Note that only the evolutionary rule λ∗ found in
Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001) has this property so that in the long run this
strategy has the highest expected growth rate.
Let us finally compare the evolutionary portfolio rule λ∗ with the CAPM-
rule, λCAPM . According to the CAPM, a passive buy and hold strategy, one
should hold a fixed fraction of the market portfolio. In the notation of this
18
paper, this would translate to having the demand aCAPMt,k = γts
k
t , where
γt = (
∑
k p
k
t s
k
t )
−1 is some positive scalar. In terms of budget shares the
CAPM-strategy is: λCAPMt,k = γtp
k
t s
k
t , k = 1, ...K.
The first observation is that in a rational and risk neutral market, λ∗
would actually coincide with the CAPM-rule because in such a market asset
prices are determined by discounted expected dividends, i.e. pk = 1rf Ed
k,
k = 1, ...,K, where rf denotes the risk free rate of interest. As λ∗ gains total
market wealth, prices converge to the rational and risk neutral valuation and
thus λ∗ and the CAPM-rule will eventually coincide. Hence while λ∗ exploits
the wealth of other strategies it will never be able to drive out the CAPM-rule.
In a sense, the CAPM-rule is a imitation strategy that eventually mimics the
best performing strategy.
In passing note that similar to contrarian strategies from behavioral fi-
nance the evolutionary portfolio rule eventually eliminates the market anoma-
ly from which it lives. As long as pk %= 1rf Edk, k = 1, ...,K there are excess
returns and hence λ∗ can grow at the expense of the existing ones. And in
the limit as the distribution of wealth concentrates on λ∗ these excess returns
are removed.
7 Conclusions
Our simulations have shown that in competition with rebalancing rules de-
rived from Mean-Variance-Optimization, from Maximum Growth Theory
and from Behavioral Finance the Evolutionary Portfolio rule discovered in
Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001) will eventually hold total market wealth. Ac-
cording to this simple rule the portfolio weights should be proportional to the
expected relative dividends of the assets. This rule may be interpreted as a
CAPM-rule which fixes budget shares according to the expected market cap-
italization and then rebalances according to these weights as prices fluctuate.
For sufficiently patient investors, like pension funds or insurance companies
for example, this rule promises very high proceeds. On a long horizon risk is
limited – the standard deviations of the average position of the market share
are very small and almost constant over time. Risk will however matter if
the investor is subject to shocks that require to liquidate some of its wealth
at unforeseen periods. An important and also very interesting extension of
this work is to introduce such liquidity shocks in the evolutionary process of
market selection.
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